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Cognitive control refers to the unique ability to carry out 
a weak but intended response in the face of competition 
from a dominant habitual response (cf. Miller & Cohen, 
2001). For example, when booting up the computer to 
work on an overdue review, you might experience the 
temptation to open your e-mail client instead of your 
word-processing program. In order to deal with such 
response conflicts, the cognitive system has developed a 
monitoring system that detects conflicts (i.e., the concur-
rent activation of conflicting response tendencies) in the 
ongoing processing stream, and it uses this information 
to increase cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). This so-called sequential 
control adaptation has been subject to tremendous 
research in the last decade, the basic finding being that in 
classical interference tasks, interference caused by 
response conflict in one trial is substantially reduced, if 
not eliminated, in the subsequent trial (for a review, see 
Egner, 2007). Conflict adaptation can thus be considered 
a prime example of flexible human action control. Here, 
we aim to provide an answer to the question of what 
exactly it is about the conflict that initially motivates this 
control adaptation.
Sequential Control Adaptation: The 
Gratton Effect
One of the most influential demonstrations of sequential 
control adaptation came from Gratton, Coles, and 
Donchin (1992), using the Eriksen flanker task. 
Participants had to identify a letter in the center of a letter 
string that was either identical to its surrounding flanker 
letters (compatible trials; e.g., “HHHHH,” “SSSSS”) or dif-
ferent from them (e.g., “HHSHH,” “SSHSS”). The flanker 
interference is the robustly observed effect of higher 
reaction times and error rates for incompatible than for 
compatible trials. Results revealed the so-called Gratton 
effect, whereby this flanker interference on incompatible 
trials was smaller after a preceding incompatible trial 
than after a preceding compatible trial.1 Since then, com-
parable sequential-adaptation effects have been reported 
for other response interference tasks, such as the Simon 
569569 CDPXXX10.1177/0963721415569569Dreisbach, FischerConflicts as Aversive Signals
research-article2015
Corresponding Author:
Gesine Dreisbach, Department of Experimental Psychology, University 
of Regensburg, Universitätsstraße 31, 93053 Regensburg, Germany 
E-mail: gesine.dreisbach@psychologie.uni-regensburg.de
Conflicts as Aversive Signals for  
Control Adaptation
Gesine Dreisbach1 and Rico Fischer2
1Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Regensburg, and 2Department of Psychology, 
Technische Universität Dresden
Abstract
The dynamic adaptation of cognitive control in the face of competition from conflicting response tendencies is one 
of the hallmarks of flexible human action control. Here, we suggest an alternative framework that places conflict-
triggered control adaptation into the broader context of affect regulation. Specifically, we review evidence showing 
that (a) conflicts are inherently aversive, that (b) aversive stimuli in the absence of conflict also trigger behavioral 
adjustments, and, finally, that (c) conflict stimuli do trigger processes of affective counter-regulation. Together with 
recent findings showing that conflict-triggered control adaptation depends on the subjective experience of the conflict, 
we suggest that it is the subjective aversive conflict experience that originally motivates control adaptations. Such a 
view offers new perspectives for investigating and understanding intra- and interindividual differences in the regulation 
of cognitive control by differentiating between the individual sensitivity to experience and the individual ability to 
utilize the aversive signal.
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task (Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 
2002), the Stroop task (Kerns et al., 2004), and even dual-
task contexts (Fischer, Gottschalk, & Dreisbach, 2014).
About 10 years later, Botvinick and colleagues (2001) 
provided a formal (computational) model explaining 
these sequential control adjustments. Basically, they sug-
gested a conflict-monitoring module (located in the ante-
rior cingulate cortex, ACC) that gets activated by the 
concurrent activation of conflicting response alternatives. 
This conflict signal is then sent to a control unit (e.g., the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, DLPFC), which in turn 
sends biasing signals back to the input units, conse-
quently reducing the conflict in the upcoming conflict 
trial. The beauty of the model (and its success) lies in its 
independence of an omniscient homunculus: The cogni-
tive system does not have to know the correct answer; it 
simply detects the difficulties due to incompatible 
response activations and increases cognitive control. This 
rather deterministic approach, however, does not explain 
what exactly it is that motivates this sequential control 
adaptation.
What Is It That Motivates Conflict 
Adaptation?
In the original conflict model by Botvinick and col-
leagues, the conflict is computed over the output nodes 
and, after reaching a certain threshold, automatically sig-
nals the need for cognitive control to the task unit. The 
question we ask is, why should the concurrent activation 
of competing responses motivate the investment of cog-
nitive resources when it is not even clear what the next 
trial will bring? Even though such a conflict-control loop 
seems adaptive, we assume that conflict occurrence 
alone cannot be the sole trigger for conflict adaptation 
because conflict (measureable response interference) 
does not always result in conflict adaptation (Desender, 
Van Opstal, & Van den Bussche, 2014). We therefore 
suggest an alternative framework that emphasizes the 
aversive nature of conflicts as the driving force (cf. 
Botvinick, 2007). Specifically, we argue that (a) conflicts 
are inherently aversive and that (b) this aversive conflict 
experience triggers processes aimed at down-regulating 
the aversive conflict signal. From there, we speculate 
that conflict adaptation, so far taken as an indication of 
sequential action regulation, might actually represent an 
instantiation of affect regulation. To substantiate our 
arguments, we will now review recent evidence from 
our labs.
Conflicts are aversive signals
The first indirect evidence for the aversive nature of 
conflict stemmed from a study suggesting that random 
gain cues (random cues between trials that signaled 
rewards that were not contingent on the preceding per-
formance) between conflict trials counteract the aver-
sive conflict signal and consequently eliminate conflict 
adaptation (van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009). 
In two studies, we provided the first direct evidence for 
the aversive nature of response conflicts using the affec-
tive priming paradigm (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986). The logic behind this paradigm is that 
the affective valence of primes presented shortly before 
unambiguous positive or negative targets modulates the 
affective evaluation of those targets accordingly. In the 
first study, we therefore presented congruent and incon-
gruent Stroop color words (e.g., “RED” printed in red vs. 
green) as primes, which were followed by unambiguous 
positive and negative stimuli (Experiment 1a: positive 
and negative pictures; Experiment 1b: positive and neg-
ative words). Participants then gave speeded affective 
evaluations of the targets. In both experiments, we 
found an interaction of prime congruence and target 
valence: Responses to negative targets were faster after 
incongruent than after congruent primes, and responses 
to positive targets were slower after incongruent than 
after congruent primes (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; see 
Fig.  1). In a second study, we showed that conflict 
primes not only ease the evaluation of negative targets, 
they also increase the number of negative judgments of 
neutral targets (Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013). Taken together, 
these studies thus provided converging evidence that 
conflict stimuli are aversive (see also Schouppe et al., 
2015).
Fig. 1. Results from Dreisbach and Fischer (2012a) demonstrating faster 
categorizations of negative and slower categorizations of positive tar-
get pictures and words following incongruent compared to congruent 
Stroop primes. RT = reaction time. Adapted from “Conflicts as Aversive 
Signals,” by G. Dreisbach and R. Fischer, 2012, Brain and Cognition, 78, 
p. 96. Copyright 2012 by Elsevier. Adapted with permission.
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Aversive signals trigger sequential 
adaptation even in the absence of 
conflict
It might seem counterintuitive that an aversive signal 
should have any motivational function other than avoid-
ance. However, exactly this kind of motivation by frustra-
tion has proven to be a very strong motivator under 
conditions of partial reinforcement schedules (e.g., 
Amsel, 1992). The parallel we see here is that an aversive 
signal (e.g., the lack of reward) can indeed be a strong 
force for increased effort investment. Now, if it is the 
aversive nature of conflicts that initially motivates sequen-
tial control adaptations, aversive stimulus features beyond 
response conflicts should also trigger sequential process-
ing adjustments. In three experiments, we implemented 
the affective valence of fluency of processing as an aver-
sive stimulus feature (Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, 
& Reber, 2003). Fluency of processing describes the 
experienced ease of perceptual and/or motor process-
ing—as an example, imagine the annoying experience of 
reading a bad copy from a printer that is running out of 
toner. Accordingly, we manipulated the perceptual flu-
ency by varying the readability of written numbers. We 
predicted a fluency effect (faster reaction times for fluent 
numbers) and a sequential modulation of the fluency 
effect (i.e., a smaller fluency effect following disfluent 
stimuli). Results fully confirmed our hypotheses: Aversive 
(disfluent) stimuli triggered sequential processing adjust-
ments in the absence of conflict (Dreisbach & Fischer, 
2011; see Fig. 2).
Aversive conflict signals trigger 
affective counter-regulation
In another study, we manipulated the presentation dura-
tion of Stroop primes that were always followed by neu-
tral target stimuli. Participants provided speeded affective 
evaluations of the target stimuli. Results replicated 
increased negative judgments for neutral targets after 
incongruent primes, but only with the usual short (i.e., 
200- and 400-millisecond) prime presentation times. 
Increasing the prime presentation duration to 800 milli-
seconds, however, significantly reversed the effect: 
Neutral targets were eventually evaluated even more pos-
itively after incongruent Stroop primes than after congru-
ent Stroop primes (Fritz & Dreisbach, 2015; see Fig. 3).
With increasing conflict persistence, the aversive sig-
nal thus seems to initiate processes of affective counter-
regulation to reduce the aversive conflict experience (see 
Rothermund, 2011). This also explains why aversive sig-
nals that are not part of the conflict stimulus but are pre-
sented in between conflict trials eliminate conflict 
adaptation, as they draw on resources that are then no 
longer available for adaptation (e.g., Padmala, Bauer, & 
Pessoa, 2011). Another closely related finding is that con-
flict-priming effects reverse when participants are asked 
to respond to the conflict prime first and to evaluate the 
affective target afterward (Schouppe et  al., 2015). This 
effect was predicted on the basis of the idea that conflict 
resolution is rewarding (see also Braem, Verguts, 
Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012; Dreisbach & Fischer, 
2012b) and therefore associated with positive affect. Both 
studies thus converged on the idea that conflicts motivate 
processes to end the aversive conflict experience either 
by solving the conflict or—if the conflict persists—by 
affective counter-regulation.
Taken together, the reviewed evidence provides strong 
support for the idea that conflict stimuli are inherently 
aversive, that sequential control adaptation does not rely 
on the presence of response conflict (but, rather, on aver-
sive signals), and that conflict stimuli motivate affective 
counter-regulation.
What Is the Function of the Aversive 
Conflict Signal?
The aversive conflict signal might be a mere byproduct of 
the reduced fluency of processing of conflict stimuli. 
Alternatively—and this is the explanation we favor—it is 
the aversive signal, and not the conflict proper, that ini-
tially motivates sequential conflict adjustments. In fact, 
the results from one recent study (Desender et al., 2014) 
might be interpreted in support of this assumption. There, 
sequential conflict adaptation was found only after 
Fig. 2. Results from Experiment 3 of Dreisbach and Fischer (2011). 
Participants had to categorize written number stimuli (“one,” “two,” 
“three,” “four,” “six,” “seven,” “eight,” “nine”) according to magnitude 
(smaller vs. bigger than 5). Number words occurred in either a fluent or 
a disfluent font. The figure shows reaction times (left panel) and error 
rates (right panel) as a function of fluency in trial N – 1 and fluency 
in trial N. RT = reaction time. Adapted from “‘If It’s Hard to Read… 
Try Harder!’ Processing Fluency as a Signal for Effort Adjustments,” by 
G. Dreisbach and R. Fischer, 2011, Psychological Research, 75, p. 381. 
Copyright 2011 by Springer. Adapted with permission.
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conflict trials that were also subjectively experienced as 
such, whereas the response interference itself (the per-
formance difference between congruent and incongruent 
trials) was completely unaffected by subjective experi-
ence.2 This shows that a response conflict can be only a 
necessary but not a sufficient precondition for sequential 
conflict adaptation to occur. The original conflict model 
(Botvinick et al., 2001), however, does not leave much 
room to explain this observed dissociation between con-
flict detection and subjective conflict experience. 
Interestingly, there is one brain structure that—in most 
studies—is activated jointly with the conflict-detector 
ACC—namely, the anterior insular cortex (AIC; Craig, 
2009). This structure might be sensitive to the subjective 
conflict experience, just as it has been proven to be sen-
sitive to all sorts of subjective bodily experiences, includ-
ing interoception, body sensations, and emotional 
awareness (Craig, 2009). This division of labor might thus 
provide the neuropsychological basis for the assumed 
interplay between subjective conflict experience (AIC), 
conflict detection (ACC), and conflict adaptation 
(DLPFC).3 As a working hypothesis, we therefore suggest 
that it is the subjective (and presumably aversive) conflict 
experience that motivates sequential control adaptations, 
whereas the specific conflict stimulus informs about the 
specific measures needed to solve the conflict.
Implications
The idea that the aversive nature of conflicts motivates 
sequential conflict adaptation opens new perspectives 
for the investigation of cognitive-control adjustments, 
especially when it comes to intra- and interindividual dif-
ferences. One prediction would be that participants with 
known difficulties experiencing bodily sensations (cf. 
Damasio, 1996) might also show a reduced adaptation to 
conflict. Conversely, participants with a sustained or tran-
siently enhanced sensitivity for negative signals, such as 
participants who score high on trait anxiety (Osinsky, 
Alexander, Gebhardt, & Hennig, 2010) or participants in 
a negative (mood-congruent) state (van Steenbergen, 
Band, & Hommel, 2010; van Steenbergen, Booij, Band, 
Hommel, & van der Does, 2012), might show an even 
stronger adaptation to the aversive conflict signal. From 
the perspective taken here, difficulties in conflict adapta-
tion might thus be ascribed to either an emotional or a 
cognitive deficit (cf. de Galan, Sellaro, Colzato, & 
Hommel, 2014). Differences in the amount of individual 
conflict adaptation might then be ascribed either to the 
individual sensitivity to experience the aversive conflict 
signal or to the individual ability to use the conflict signal 
for control adaptations. At this point, however, it is hard 
to decide between these two possibilities. One possible 
way to resolve this might be to measure the individual 
conflict sensitivity via conflict priming (Dreisbach & 
Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013, 2015) as one pre-
dictor of conflict adaptation.
Conclusion
On the basis of the reviewed evidence, we have argued 
that it is the aversive signal of conflicts that motivates 
sequential control adaptation, thereby placing conflict-
triggered action regulation into the broader context of 
affect regulation. Highlighting the motivational and affec-
tive components in the conflict-triggered adjustments of 
cognitive control should offer fertile ground and new 
perspectives for investigating and understanding intra- 
and interindividual differences in the regulation of cogni-
tive control. On a broader level, such an approach will 
further our understanding of the fascinating interplay of 
motivational, affective, and cognitive processes in flexi-
ble human action control.
Recommended Reading
Botvinick, M. (2007). (See References). Provides an integrative 
view of the role of the anterior cingulate cortex in cogni-
tive control.
Dreisbach, G. & Fischer, R. (in press). Conflicts as aversive 
signals: Motivation for control adaptation in the service of 
affect regulation. In Todd S. Braver (Ed.), Motivation and 
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Fig. 3. Results from Fritz and Dreisbach (2015) demonstrating the 
decreasing frequency of negative target evaluations with increasing 
conflict-prime presentation duration (200 milliseconds, 400 milliseconds, 
800 milliseconds) and a constant prime–target interval of 800 millisec-
onds. Adapted from “The Time Course of the Aversive Conflict Signal,” 
by J. Fritz and G. Dreisbach, 2015, Experimental Psychology, 62, p. 36. 
Copyright 2015 by Hogrefe Publishing. Adapted with permission.
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cognitive control. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Places 
the ideas presented here in a broader context.
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Notes
1. The technical term used in the field is sequential conflict 
adaptation; a more generic term is sequential control adapta-
tion or sequential control adjustment. All terms describe the 
observation that control requirements experienced in trial N 
modulate the invested amount of control in trial N + 1.
2. Conflict (vs. no conflict) was induced by a mismatch (vs. 
match) between a subliminally presented arrow and an arrow 
target. Participants were asked after each trial whether they had 
“felt” a conflict or not. Note that this feeling was independent 
of the conscious conflict experience.
3. There have been further ideas of division of labor associ-
ated with subregions along the dorsal versus rostral part of the 
ACC (e.g., Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; van Steenbergen, Band, 
Hommel, Rombouts, & Nieuwenhuis, 2014). This segregation-
ist view, however, has been criticized (for a meta-analysis, see 
Shackman et al., 2011).
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